

## ARISTOTLE ON PRACTICAL WISDOM

by Paul Schollmeier, Washington

### I.

Most moral philosophers would probably agree that contemporary moral theory has somehow gone awry. Contemporary moral theory appears to lead us to sophisticated emotivisms, which are all too impotent, or to crude materialisms, which are all too potent. Many philosophers would consequently argue that moral theory must return to an ethics of virtue. An ethics of virtue appears to allow for the cultivation of our emotions rather than their mere indulgence. And an ethics of this kind also appears to set a limit to the accumulation of wealth in any of its forms.<sup>1</sup>

But for an ethics of virtue we would probably not do better than to return to the classical theories of ethics. Indeed, the classical theories are the paradigmatic theories of virtue ethics. And foremost among these theories we of course find Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics*, which is an extraordinary theory of virtue, both intellectual and moral. But to understand his theory of virtue, we must have a firm grasp of Aristotle's conception of practical wisdom. For practical wisdom is the intellectual virtue with which we develop moral virtue by grasping practical truth and coercing desire. Unfortunately, we have yet to reach a consensus about what functions Aristotelian practical wisdom has. A few philosophers still disagree about whether practical wisdom concerns the ends of our actions, though all agree that it concerns the means. And if most agree that practical wisdom concerns the ends, many philosophers still disagree about what grasp practical wisdom has of the ends.

In this paper, I intend to analyze Aristotle's conception of practical wisdom with these issues in mind. And I shall contend that practical wisdom has two functions concerned with practical knowledge, and that these functions are an intuitive function and a discursive function. The intuitive function is practical intuition, and practical intuition concerns the ends of our actions. The discursive function is deliberation, which concerns the means to our ends.

<sup>1</sup> Recent scholarship on the virtues would include Georg Henrik von Wright, *The Varieties of Goodness* (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1963); Philippa Foot, *Virtues and Vices* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1978); and Alasdair MacIntyre, *After Virtue* (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981).

## II.

We must first of all recall that Aristotle argues that theoretical knowledge of any kind is quite different from practical knowledge of any kind. Within the principled element of the soul, Aristotle differentiates two parts from one another by distinguishing their objects. The one part concerns things which cannot be other than they are, the other part things which can be other than they are:

Let us assert that there are two parts of the soul which have a principle. The one part is that by which we see the sort of things of which the first principles cannot be otherwise, the other is that by which we see things which can be otherwise. For with respect to objects different in kind, the parts of the soul answering to each of the two objects naturally differ in kind, since the knowledge belongs to these parts in accordance with some similarity and kinship (*Eth.* 6. 1. 1139a6–11—translations mine).

He assumes in this argument that we may distinguish the faculties of the soul by distinguishing their habits and the objects of these habits.

Aristotle explicitly differentiates theoretical wisdom from practical wisdom in the same way. He states explicitly that theoretical wisdom concerns things divine (*Eth.* 6. 7. 1141b3–8). And that practical wisdom concerns things human—things which can be otherwise:

Practical wisdom concerns things human and things about which we deliberate. For this is most of all the function of a man of practical wisdom—to deliberate well. And no one deliberates about things which cannot be otherwise (*Eth.* 6. 7. 1141b8–11).

He also divides theoretical wisdom into intuition and science (*Eth.* 6. 7. 1141a18–20). And he indicates that both intuition and science concern things which cannot be otherwise. Intuition is the virtue giving us the capacity to grasp immediate principles of demonstration (*Eth.* 6. 6. 1141a3–8), and these principles are invariable things (1140b31–1141a1). Science is the virtue giving us the capacity to demonstrate conclusions (*Eth.* 6. 3. 1139b31–35), and these conclusions are also invariable (1139b19–22).

We thus see that Aristotle sharply distinguishes theoretical knowledge from practical knowledge. Theoretical knowledge concerns things that cannot be otherwise, practical knowledge concerns things that can be otherwise. In fact we might more properly call practical knowledge opinion (see *Eth.* 6. 4. 1140b25–38).<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> When they compare theoretical and practical wisdom, modern scholars would for the most part agree that Aristotle differentiates theoretical wisdom from practical wisdom by distinguishing knowledge of invariable objects from knowledge of variable objects. But these scholars usually forget how Aristotle distinguishes between theoretical and practical wisdom, when they analyze practical wisdom by itself. They argue that theoretical intuition grasps the ends of our actions, and that practical intuition grasps the means to these ends. For example, see Adolf Trendelenburg, *Historische Beiträge zur*

But even if they concerned the same objects, Aristotle would still argue that the theoretical and practical parts of the intellect have functions that differ. The theoretical part has the function of grasping truth only, but the practical part has the functions of grasping truth and of coercing desire (*Eth.* 6. 2. 1139a27–31). For pursuit and avoidance originate in virtue, virtue in choice, and choice – good choice – in true principle and right desire (1139a21–26). And true principle makes desire right (*Eth.* 1. 13. 1102b29–1103a3).

And so we see that the theoretical intellect cannot be practical. The theoretical intellect concerns objects of a different kind than those of the practical intellect, and the theoretical intellect lacks a function of the practical intellect.

### III.

We must accordingly ask what knowledge constitutes practical wisdom? For practical wisdom is knowledge of practical truth and practical truth we use to make desire right.

We can hardly doubt that practical wisdom includes knowledge of the means to the ends of our actions. Aristotle is very explicit. When he defines practical wisdom, Aristotle turns to the man who is practically wise (*Eth.* 6. 5. 1140a24–25). He concludes initially that the practically wise man can generally deliberate (1140a30–31). And he clearly implies that deliberation concerns means:

To the man of practical wisdom seems to belong the capacity to deliberate well about the things good for himself and the things in his interest. But not about things good in part. For example, not things of the sort conducive to health or to strength. But things of the sort conducive to living well generally (*Eth.* 6. 5. 1140a25–28).

He also specifies to some extent what means deliberation concerns. These means are those conducive to living well. Those conducive to happiness.

When he defines deliberation, Aristotle also argues that deliberation is not about ends but about means:

*Philosophie*, 3 vols., (Berlin: Verlag von G. Bethge, 1846–1867); Gustav Teichmüller, *Neue Studien zur Geschichte der Begriffe*, 3 vols., 1879 ed., (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1965); Richard Loening, *Die Zurechnungslehre des Aristoteles*, 1903 ed., (Hildesheim: Georg Olms Verlagsbuchhandlung, 1967); Alexander Grant, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, 2 vols., 4th ed., (London: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1885); J. A. Stewart, *Notes on the Nicomachean Ethics*, 2 vols., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1892); John Burnet, *The Ethics of Aristotle*, 1900 ed., (New York: Arno Press, 1973); Pierre Aubenque, *La Prudence chez Aristote*, (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963); René Antoine Gauthier et Jean Yves Jolif, *L'éthique à Nicomaque*, 2 vols., 2nd ed., (Louvain: Publications Universitaires, 1970). Also see John M. Cooper, *Reason and Human Good in Aristotle*, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1975); Anthony Kenny, *The Aristotelian Ethics* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1978); W. F. R. Hardie, *Aristotle's Ethical Theory*, 2nd ed., (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1980).

Deliberation seems to concern actions to be done by oneself, and these actions are for the sake of other actions. For the object of deliberation is not the end but the things that lead to the end (*Eth.* 3. 3. 1112b32–34).

And he uses examples drawn from the professions of medicine, rhetoric, and politics to prove that we assume our end and consider through what means we may attain it (*Eth.* 3. 3. 1112b11–16). He also illustrates the problems that arise in choosing a means with the well known analogy to geometry (1112b16–24).

We thus see that we have practical knowledge, if not about our ends, at least about the means to our ends. For a man of practical wisdom has the capacity to deliberate, and deliberation is about means.

We might be tempted to argue that deliberation grasps the ends of our actions as well. For if it does, we could show that practical wisdom includes a grasp of the ends of our actions. The best argument of this sort appears to be that deliberation concerns ends because it concerns not only means extrinsic to ends but also means intrinsic to them. And that deliberation concerning intrinsic means determines what ends agents ought to have.

Unfortunately, this argument faces a very serious difficulty. The difficulty is that of denying an obvious fact. Aristotle explicitly asserts that we do not deliberate about ends (see again *Eth.* 3. 3. 1112b11–12; and 1112b33–34). Not only does he deny that deliberation concerns ends, Aristotle also gives us an indication of why we do not deliberate about ends. When he defines choice, which concludes deliberation, he argues that choice concerns things that lead to an end. Unlike wish, which concerns an end, choice concerns neither things that are impossible nor things impossible for us (*Eth.* 3. 2. 1111b20–26). Choice concerns only the things that come to be through us:

Wish is rather for the end, choice for the things that lead to the end. For example, we wish for health, but we choose the things through which we are healthy. And we wish to be happy, or say we do, but we do not appropriately say that we choose to be happy. For choice generally concerns the things that come to be through us (*Eth.* 3. 2. 1111b26–30).

He assumes that an end is not a thing that comes to be through us. And if we reflect for a moment, we can see that an end is not within our power. At least not immediately. For an extrinsic means may constitute a weak link between us and our end. A means may misfire and fail to attain an end. But an intrinsic means may also fail. Through our efforts, one part of a whole may materialize, but other parts may not.

We must however admit that deliberation does appear to be about an end. For deliberation may conclude with a choice not only to attempt to attain an end but also to abandon an attempt at an end. For we may discover that the means necessary for an end are impossible for us (*Eth.* 3. 3. 1112b24–27). And by choosing the means or not choosing them, we may appear to choose an end or not to choose it.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> Wiggins of course presents an argument of the sort under discussion (David Wiggins, „Deliberation and Practical Reason“, *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 76

We thus see that practical wisdom is about means, for deliberation is about means. And that deliberation is not about ends.

#### IV.

If we take a closer look, we shall see that Aristotle's discussion of practical wisdom implies a more complex analysis of this virtue than is usually supposed. Though deliberation does not, practical wisdom does appear to concern the ends of our actions as well as the means.

Aristotle's definition itself suggests that practical wisdom concerns the ends of our actions. By elimination of other alternatives, Aristotle defines practical wisdom as a true habit which is practical:

The remaining alternative is that practical wisdom is a habit which is true and follows from a principle and which is practical and concerns that which is good or evil for human beings (*Eth.* 6. 5. 1140b4-6).

Please notice that with the last clause of this definition Aristotle implies that practical wisdom is a habit which concerns the ends of our actions. For he asserts that practical wisdom concerns human good and evil. And human good and evil are our ends.

And after defining practical wisdom, Aristotle draws two corollaries from his definition. These two corollaries also imply that practical wisdom includes a grasp of the end. The first corollary concerns Pericles. Pericles is practically wise because he can see what is good for men:

Because of this, we think that Pericles and men such as he are practically wise, because they are able to see what is good for themselves and for human beings (*Eth.* 6. 5. 1140b7-10).

If they can see what is good for humans, Pericles and these other men can see what is an end for human beings. For what is good for us is an action which is itself an end.

The second corollary concerns temperance. The Greek word for temperance suggests to Aristotle that this virtue preserves practical wisdom (*Eth.* 6. 5. 1140b11-12). And he argues quite explicitly that temperance preserves practical wisdom by preserving a judgment about the first principles of our actions:

And temperance preserves a judgment of practical wisdom. For pleasure and pain do not destroy and distort all judgments, like the judgment that a triangle has its angles equal to two right angles or does not. But they affect judgments concerning things to be done. For the first principles of things to be done are

(1975-76), pp. 29-51, esp. pp. 30-36). Even without the textual evidence against this argument we would still have to admit that the distinction between extrinsic and intrinsic means would fail to prove that we deliberate about ends. When we deliberate about an intrinsic means, we deliberate only about a part of a whole and not about a whole itself. For an intrinsic means is only a part viewed as a means. We never deliberate about an end. For an end is noway a part but always a whole.

those for the sake of which the things are to be done. And the first principle does not appear at once to him who has been destroyed by pleasure or pain—neither that for the sake of this, nor that because of this, he must choose and do all things. For vice is destructive of the first principle (*Eth.* 6. 5. 1140b12–20).

He clearly argues that pleasure and pain destroy a judgment concerning the end of our actions. For they destroy a judgment about the first principles of things to be done, and the first principles are those for the sake of which we act. These principles concern the ends of our actions.

Also consider again Aristotle's discussion of the man of practical wisdom. When he explains how he deliberates, Aristotle implies that the man of practical wisdom has some grasp of the ends of his actions. For he does not deliberate well about the means toward any end, but he deliberates well about the means toward an end absolutely good (*Eth.* 6. 5. 1140a25–28; also *Eth.* 6. 9. 1142b28–31).

Practical wisdom would therefore appear to concern the ends of our actions. But how does wisdom of this sort concern the ends of our actions, if deliberation does not concern them? Practical wisdom appears to include another virtue which concerns these ends, and this other virtue is practical intuition.

Aristotle is never completely explicit about what connection practical wisdom may have with practical intuition. But he does present an occasional clue suggesting that practical wisdom may include practical intuition. After comparing mathematical prodigies to men of practical wisdom, he would appear to suggest that practical wisdom includes apperception of some practical sort:

Practical wisdom is of the ultimate fact, for which there is not science but apperception—not a perception of qualities peculiar to one sense but an apperception akin to that by which we apperceive in mathematical diagrams that the ultimate fact is a triangle. For there will be a limit there too. But that apperception is rather apperception than practical wisdom, though a different species of awareness than that of the qualities peculiar to one sense (*Eth.* 6. 8. 1142a26–30).

He argues that practical wisdom includes the apperception of the ultimate practical fact. And he explains that the apperception of the ultimate fact of this sort resembles the apperception by which we grasp that an ultimate fact is a triangle. And that this practical apperception and its mathematical counterpart both differ from the perception of qualities proper to one sense.

In his summary of the intellectual virtues, Aristotle also asserts that the apperception of an ultimate fact is the same as the intuition of an ultimate fact. And he implies that the intuition of an ultimate fact includes a grasp of the ends of our actions. Comparing them explicitly, he first differentiates theoretical intuition from practical intuition. He asserts that intuition in general may concern ultimate facts which are either invariable or variable:

Intuition concerns the ultimate facts in two ways. For intuition concerns both the first definitions and the ultimate facts, and argument does not. The intuition in accordance with which there are demonstrations grasps the definitions which are immovable and first. The intuition which is in practical argu-

ments grasps the fact which is ultimate and variable and which yields a proposition of a different kind (*Eth.* 6. 11. 1143a35–1143b3).

He differentiates intuition in two kinds. Theoretical intuition concerns the definitions of demonstrations, and these definitions cannot be otherwise, for they are immovable as well as first. But practical intuition concerns the facts of practical arguments, and these facts can be otherwise, for they are variable and yield propositions of a different kind than those of theoretical intuition.

Notice that he differentiates theoretical intuition from practical intuition in the same way in which he differentiates the theoretical intellect from the practical intellect. For he differentiates theoretical intuition from practical intuition by distinguishing between invariable objects and variable objects.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup> Most modern scholars do nevertheless attempt to argue that in this passage Aristotle distinguishes the major premise of a practical syllogism from the minor premise of a practical syllogism. They usually argue that theoretical intuition yields a universal major premise, and that practical intuition yields a particular minor premise. But these men would thus imply that theoretical propositions are only universal and not particular, and that practical propositions are not universal but only particular. For example, Trendelenburg argues that theoretical intuition grasps the major premise, which is universal and immovable, and that practical intuition grasps the minor premise, which is particular and variable (Trendelenburg, vol. 2, ch. 10, pp. 375–377). Grant argues similarly that theoretical intuition grasps the major premise, which is universal and immutable, and that practical intuition grasps the minor premise, which is particular and contingent (Grant, vol. 2, pp. 179–180). Gauthier argues that theoretical intuition grasps the major premise, which he implies is universal and abstract, and that practical intuition grasps the minor premise, which is particular and concrete (Gauthier and Jolif, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 536–537). Kenny would appear to go so far as to argue that theoretical wisdom as well as practical wisdom includes both theoretical intuition, which grasps a universal and necessary major premise, and another intuition, which grasps a particular and contingent premise (Kenny, ch. 7, pp. 170–172).

These scholars appear to allow themselves to be thrown off the trail by Aristotle's Greek and its ambiguity. Aristotle permits himself to use ambiguous terms in this passage, even though it is so crucial. One ambiguous term of significance is „τῶν ἑσχάτων“ or „τοῦ ἑσχάτου“, and another significant term is „τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως“. One could correctly translate the term „τῆς ἑτέρας προτάσεως“ as „the different premise“. And most scholars do assume with little or no argument that Aristotle refers to a premise different than a major premise. But if we so translate this term, we would in effect advance an interpretation denying any distinction between the theoretical and a practical intellect. For we would have a syllogism with a theoretical major premise and a practical minor premise. Therefore, one would better translate this term most literally as „the different proposition“ or less literally as „the proposition of a different kind“. By so doing, we first of all retain the ambiguity of the original text. But we also show how the text does allow for an interpretation affirming that the practical intellect grasps both a major premise and a minor premise for a syllogism. One could translate the term „τῶν ἑσχάτων“ or „τοῦ ἑσχάτου“ as „the ultimate premises“ or „the ultimate premise“. And most scholars also assume without argument that Aristotle refers only to an ultimate premise in a syllogism. But in so doing they again create a bastard syllogism with a theoretical major premise and a practical minor premise. Aristotle appears rather to refer to a major premise as well as to a minor premise. For practical intuition grasps

Aristotle continues his argument by implying that practical intuition concerns the ends of our actions. For he implies that practical intuition concerns the ultimate and variable facts which are the first principles of our actions:

The first principles of that for the sake of which are these ultimate facts, for from the particulars arise the universals. Of these, we must therefore have apperception, and this apperception is intuition (*Eth.* 6. 11. 1143b4–5).

He asserts in effect that practical intuition grasps the ends of our actions. For practical intuition grasps the ultimate facts, and the ultimate facts include the first principles for the sake of which we act. These first principles are universals arising from particulars.<sup>5</sup>

ultimate facts of both kinds for a practical syllogism. One would best translate this term most literally with the phrase „the ultimates“ or „the ultimate“ or less literally with the phrase „the ultimate facts“ or „the ultimate fact“. We thus do not lose the original ambiguity of the text. Nor do we preclude any interpretation dependent on its ambiguity.

<sup>5</sup> Many modern commentators argue that theoretical intuition grasps the universal first principles of action and that practical intuition grasps only first principles of induction and not first principles of action. They argue that practical intuition grasps only particular facts, which serve as variable principles from which we induce invariable principles of actions. These commentators thus fail to see that practical intuition grasps both variable particular propositions and variable universal propositions. And that practical intuition grasps not only the particular propositions of an inductive process but also the first principles of action. For practical principles of both types are variable. For example, Trendelenburg argues that practical intuition apperceives only particular ends, and that from these apperceptions we form our conceptions of universal ends by induction (Trendelenburg, vol. 3, ch. 10, pp. 383–384). Grant argues that practical intuition grasps only particular facts, and that out of these facts the moral universal grows up (Grant, vol. 2, pp. 179–180). Gauthier argues similarly that practical intuition grasps only the concrete facts, and that from these facts the universal rule arises by induction (Gauthier and Jolif, vol. 2, pt. 2, pp. 538–539).

Some scholars would seem to recognize that the first principles of action must be variable. These scholars usually argue either that theoretical intuition of theoretical science differs from theoretical intuition of practical science or that theoretical intuition of practical science concerns variable objects. For example, since he asserts that theoretical intuition has nothing to do with practice, Teichmüller would seem to recognize that practical intuition concerns both the major and minor premises of practical syllogisms. But he argues that theoretical intuition supplies invariable premises only for theoretical sciences, and that practical intuition supplies invariable premises for practical sciences. And he asserts that premises of practical sciences are also major premises of practical syllogisms (Teichmüller, vol. 3, ch. 5, sec. 7, pp. 210–220). Loening would also seem to recognize that practical intuition concerns the first principles of our actions. But he takes the position that practical science has a subject matter consisting of variable objects. He argues that practical intuition supplies major premises concerned with theoretical objects, and that these premises are the major premises of practical arguments. For these premises concern theoretical objects that are variable because they could happen or should happen. That is, they could be brought about or should be brought about through our efforts (Loening, sec. 2 and app., pp. 16–39).

Once again scholars allow themselves to be led astray by the ambiguity of Aristotle's Greek. In this passage Aristotle uses the ambiguous terms „ἀρχαί“ and „τοῦ οὐ ἐνεκα“.



No one has yet to deny that practical intuition also grasps the ultimate facts which are particular. Aristotle clearly implies that practical intuition yields particular propositions concerning things which can be otherwise. Apperception of these facts marks the limits of deliberation (*Eth.* 3. 3. 1112b34–1113a2).

We would then conclude that practical wisdom includes two virtues, and that these two virtues are practical intuition and deliberation. Practical intuition grasps universal propositions concerned with the ends of our actions and particular propositions concerned with the means to our ends. And deliberation grasps the right means to our ends. In other words, practical intuition supplies both major and minor premises for practical syllogisms. And deliberation selects minor premises for practical syllogisms.

## V.

Our analysis of Aristotelian practical wisdom would thus suggest that a theory of virtue ethics would have to take into account practical knowledge of two kinds. For practical wisdom would appear to include both intuitive knowledge and discursive knowledge. Practical intuition provides universal knowledge of the ends of our actions and particular knowledge of the means to our ends. And deliberation determines the right means to our ends.

One would best translate these terms as „first principles“ and „that for the sake of which“. But these phrases are as ambiguous in modern English and in other modern languages as they are in ancient Greek. What is that for the sake of which? And what are first principles? With little or no argument scholars most often assume that Aristotle uses the term „first principles“ to refer to minor premises of inductive syllogisms. And they also assume that these minor premises are variable and major premises invariable. They thus deny again the distinction between the theoretical and the practical intellect. For they imply that we may use practical premises to establish theoretical premises. And this usage of the phrase „first principles“ would appear to be rather unusual for the *Ethics*. Aristotle would most likely refer to first principles of action. For the practical intellect does grasp a major premise for a practical syllogism. This usage would be consistent with *Ethics* 6. 1. 1139a6–11 and 6. 5. 1140b12–20. Scholars usually assume also that the phrase „that for the sake of which“ refers to the end of an inductive process. This usage would again appear to be unusual for the *Ethics*. Aristotle appears most likely to refer to an end of action. For practical intuition grasps a major premise. This usage would also be consistent with 1140b12–20.

Modrak alone attempts to argue that we apperceive major premises as well as minor premises in practical syllogisms (D. K. Modrak, „Aisthesis in the Practical Syllogism“, *Philosophical Studies*, vol. 30 (1976), pp. 379–391, esp. pp. 382–383). She argues that we apperceive these universal propositions because their truth is what she calls situation dependent. That is, the circumstances in which we assert them are relevant to determining their truth value. We can not help but ask how propositions could be universal if they are true in some circumstances and false in some circumstances? Aristotle argues simply that we apperceive these propositions because they concern men and other objects which are variable things.

## DETAILS

<b>Publication title:</b>	Zeitschrift für Philosophische Forschung; Meisenheim, etc.
<b>Volume:</b>	43
<b>Issue:</b>	1
<b>First page:</b>	124
<b>Number of pages:</b>	9
<b>Publication year:</b>	1989
<b>Publication date:</b>	Jan 1, 1989
<b>Section:</b>	DISKUSSIONEN/BERICHTE
<b>Publisher:</b>	A. Hain, etc.
<b>Place of publication:</b>	Meisenheim, etc.
<b>Country of publication:</b>	Germany, Meisenheim, etc.
<b>Publication subject:</b>	Philosophy
<b>ISSN:</b>	0044-3301
<b>Source type:</b>	Scholarly Journals
<b>Document type:</b>	Article
<b>ProQuest document ID:</b>	1293536612
<b>Document URL:</b>	<a href="http://ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1293536612?accountid=3611">http://ezproxy.library.unlv.edu/login?url=https://search.proquest.com/docview/1293536612?accountid=3611</a>
<b>Last updated:</b>	2013-02-22
<b>Database:</b>	Periodicals Archive Online

## LINKS

[UNLV Find Text](#)

---

Database copyright © 2018 ProQuest LLC. All rights reserved.

[Terms and Conditions](#) [Contact ProQuest](#)